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 Abstract 
 
In many social systems, groups of individuals can find remarkably efficient solutions to             
complex cognitive problems, sometimes even outperforming a single expert. The success of            
the group, however, crucially depends on how the judgments of the group members are              
aggregated to produce the collective answer. A large variety of such aggregation methods             
have been described in the literature, such as averaging the independent judgments, relying             
on the majority or setting up a group discussion. In the present work, we introduce a novel                 
approach for aggregating judgments — the transmission chain — which has not yet been              
consistently evaluated in the context of collective intelligence. In a transmission chain, all             
group members have access to a unique collective solution and can improve it sequentially.              
Over repeated improvements, the collective solution that emerges reflects the judgments of            
every group members. We address the question of whether such a transmission chain can              
foster collective intelligence for binary-choice problems. In a series of numerical simulations,            
we explore the impact of various factors on the performance of the transmission chain, such               
as the group size, the model parameters, and the structure of the population. The              
performance of this method are compared to those of the majority rule and the              
confidence-weighted majority. Finally, we rely on two existing datasets of individuals           
performing a series of binary decisions to evaluate the expected performances of the three              
methods empirically. We find that the parameter space where the transmission chain has the              
best performance rarely appears in real datasets. We conclude that the transmission chain is              
best-suited for other types of problems, such as those that have cumulative properties. 
 
 
 
  
2 
 Introduction 
 
Collective intelligence refers to the ability of groups of individuals to find solutions to complex               
problems. The term “collective intelligence” – also referred to as “swarm intelligence” or             
“collective problem-solving” – is used in a surprisingly large diversity of interdisciplinary            
domains. These include the collective behaviour of animal swarms ​[1–3]​, the processes            
underlying group discussions and brainstorming in business and industry ​[4,5]​, the           
wisdom-of-the-crowds and other methods for combining judgments ​[6–10]​, the design of           
artificial multi-agents systems in robotics and biomimetics ​[11,12]​, the behaviour of           
pedestrian crowds ​[13–15]​, networked experiments in social computing ​[16–18]​, citizen          
science ​[19,20]​, and numerous online collaborative projects such as Wikipedia and           
Threadless ​[21]​. All these seemingly disparate domains share the same overarching           
principle: The collective solution that is produced by the group results from the ​aggregation              
of every individual’s judgment. The central question is therefore: What is the best way to               
aggregate a multitude of individual solutions?  
A very large number of such aggregation methods exist in the literature. These can be               
classified into three major families, depending on the nature of the interactions between the              
group members.  
The first family of aggregation methods concerns situations where group members ​do not             
interact with each other. In this case, a third-party decision-maker collects the independent             
solutions of each individual and aggregates them to produce the collective solution ​[8,22,23]​.             
Various aggregation methods have been proposed, such as a simple average, a majority             
rule, a quorum-based decision, or aggregation rules taking into account the confidence level             
of the individuals, such as the maximum-confidence slating or the confidence-weighted           
majority ​[8,23–25]​. For instance, the wisdom-of-the-crowds is a prominent method that           
consists in computing the mean or the median value of all individuals’ judgments ​[6]​. More               
sophisticated aggregation methods can successfully combine individual solutions even for          
complex, multi-dimensional problems, such as the traveling salesman problem ​[26]​, or           
ranking problems ​[27]​. In any case, all individual solutions must be independent from one              
another, since direct or indirect sources of social influence often undermine the power of the               
aggregation ​[7]​.  
The above family of aggregation methods has been studied for more than a century ​[6]​.               
More recently, the understanding of self-organised social systems has demonstrated that           
groups of people and swarms of animal are also capable to solve complex problems              
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 collectively ​without the intervention of a third-party decision-maker. In this case, the            
aggregation of the information is supported by the interactions among the individuals ​[13]​. In              
the ​‘90s​, biologists studying animal swarms have classified these interactions in two types:             
direct and indirect interactions ​[11,12,28,29]​, which turned out to be applicable to human             
groups as well. Formally, direct interaction refers to situation where individuals collect            
information directly from other individuals. In contrast, indirect interaction describes          
situations where individuals collect information from the collective solution that is emerging,            
which indirectly reflects what other individuals have done. In the following paragraphs, we             
describe and illustrate these two processes. 
Direct interactions constitute the second family of aggregation methods, and refer to groups             
in which the individuals collect information directly from other individuals, through visual,            
acoustic, or electronic signals. Over repeated interactions, the information that each group            
member possesses flows from individual to individual, and eventually gives rise to an             
adaptive collective response. In biological systems, fish schools and bird flocks are typical             
examples of systems that address complex problems through direct interactions. Animals           
perceive visual and acoustic cues from their neighbors and adapt their behavior accordingly.             
The propagation of information from individual to individual gives rise to collective patterns,             
for instance, when detecting and avoiding predators ​[30–32]​. In humans, situations where            
people directly interact with each other are typically group discussions. During group            
discussions, all members can freely exchange ideas, suggestions and information, and try to             
come up with a joint solution to a given problem. Depending on the structure and the                
composition of the group, the discussion can constitutes a powerful mean to aggregate             
judgments ​[4,33–35]​, but this method is also subject to various undesirable effects such as              
opinion herding, groupthink, and the hidden profile effect ​[5,36,37]​. Direct interactions can            
also take place in social networks. In networked experiments, for instance, all group             
members can observe the behavior and solution of their neighbours and adapt to it. Over               
successive rounds of interactions, the group often converges to a collective solution ​[16,17]​.             
This method has been successfully applied to the graph-colouring problem ​[16]​, and other             
collective exploration problems ​[18,38]​. 
Finally, the third family of aggregation methods contains situations where the group            
members ​indirectly interact with one another. That is, individuals do not directly collect             
information from each other, but from the current state of the collective solution. In these               
situations, individuals typically work simultaneously or sequentially on a common collective           
solution. At any moment, the current state of the collective solution drives the subsequent              
actions of the individuals. In biological systems, this type of interaction is best illustrated by               
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 the nest construction in social insects ​[39–41]​: Each piece of construction material that an              
insect deposits on the collective construction motivates the other insects to add another             
piece to the structure. Each individual collects information from the current state of the              
structure, which reflects the cumulative actions of previous workers. Over time, this process             
gives rise to small heaps, which become columns and eventually form the complex structure              
of the nest. In human groups, Wikipedia is one of the most studied examples of such indirect                 
interactions structures. Each article in Wikipedia constitutes a collective solution that results            
from the repeated updates of different individuals. Indirect interaction methods are usually            
applied to more complex problems, where the individual contributions ​accumulate over time            
to give rise to the collective solution. For instance, in the crisis-mapping task, a group of                
participants is instructed to annotate a map to indicate the zones of emergency in a               
particular area after a natural disaster has occurred ​[42]​. Every group member is facing the               
same map, can see every modification made by the other group members, and is free to                
update it at any moment. Over time, the map converges to an accurate collective solution               
that aggregates every group member’s knowledge about the situation. 
Group members may also work on the collective solution ​sequentially rather than            
simultaneously. In a transmission chain (also called diffusion chain), each group member            
updates the collective solution only once before passing it to the next individual who can               
update it in turn, and so forth until the last individual of the group (e.g. ​[43]​). Transmission                 
chains have been widely used in the domain of cultural evolution ​[44–46]​[47,48]​, in which              
evolutionary anthropologists study human’s ability to produce increasingly complex cultural          
artefacts by improving them sequentially, generation after generation. In fact, cultural           
evolution can be seen as a process relying, at least in part, on the principles of indirect                 
interactions. 
To illustrate these three families of aggregation methods, imagine a group of ten individuals              
trying to solve a jigsaw puzzle, such as the one studied by Kempe and Mesoudi ​[45]​. The                 
task consists in assembling together a large number of small pieces to produce a complete               
picture. In the ‘no-interaction’ case, each group member proposes an independent,           
possibly-incomplete solution to the problem. The individual solutions are later combined by a             
decision-maker to produce the collective solution. The decision-maker could, for example,           
follow a majority rule and fill each position of the puzzle with the piece that has been used by                   
the majority of the group members. In the ‘direct interaction’ case, all ten group members               
would sit around the puzzle and try to solve it together by exchanging ideas and suggestions                
about where to put each piece and what the final picture could look like. Finally, in the                 
‘indirect interaction’ case, every group member could sequentially look at the current state of              
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 the puzzle, try to improve it by adding new pieces or moving those that are already                
positioned, and transmit the updated version of the puzzle to the next group member who               
can update it in turn. This process repeats until the tenth individual. 
To date, most of the research on human collective intelligence focuses on aggregation             
methods that are based on direct interactions (e.g., group discussion and networked            
experiments), and on those where interaction is absent (e.g. the wisdom-of-the-crowd). In            
comparison, the mechanisms of indirect interaction methods are much less understood.           
Such methods are usually studied in very sophisticated forms and applied to very complex              
problems, which renders the basic processes of indirect interactions difficult to understand.            
Here, we address the question of whether indirect interactions could constitute an efficient             
approach for solving elementary problems. For this, we present a series of numerical             
simulations describing the expected performances of a transmission chain in the case of             
binary-choice tasks. We deliberately chose a simple aggregation method (i.e. the           
transmission chain, for which individuals sequentially update a collective solution) and a            
simple class of problems (i.e., binary-choice tasks, for which any solution is a             
unidimensional, binary object). We compared the performances of the transmission chain to            
two other aggregation methods: the majority rule and the confidence-weighted majority rule            
— two methods assuming the absence of interactions. By varying systematically the            
structure of the environment and the size of the group, we show that the best method                
depends on the structure of the environment. Furthermore, the analysis of two real datasets              
reveals which environmental structure is more likely to be found in the real world.  
 
Methods 
 
In the present work, we will examine the expected performances of the transmission chain              
as an aggregation method, and compare it to two other methods: The majority rule, which is                
commonly used for aggregating judgments in discrete choice problems, and          
confidence-weighted majority (hereafter, weighted-majority) that extends the majority rule by          
taking the confidence of the individuals into account. For this, we restrain our investigations              
to binary-choice tasks, where only two options are possible: a correct one and a wrong one. 
 
Sample population. ​As a starting point, we assume a large sample population in which a               
proportion of individuals would independently choose the correct solution to the problem q1             
in the absence of any interaction or social influence. Reversely, a proportion of            q0 = 1 − q1   
individuals in the sample population would independently choose the wrong solution. In            
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 addition, every individual’s answer is associated with a confidence level describing how          c    
confident the individual is about his or her answer. We define the confidence level as a                
continuous value ranging from 0 to 1, where refers to individuals who are very        c = 0        
uncertain about their answer, and refers to individuals who are very certain about their     c = 1           
answer. In the simulations, we describe the confidence levels of the individuals who give the               
correct answer with a beta distribution that has shape parameters and , and the      Ω1      α1   β1    
confidence levels of the individuals who give a wrong answer with a beta distribution that              Ω0   
has shape parameters and . That is, the confidence levels follow different distributions   α0   β0          
depending on whether the associated answer is correct or wrong. For many problems,             
confidence can be a good proxy for accuracy, but this tendency is not systematic and often                
non-linear ​[8,10]​. In fact, the shape of these two distributions depends on the nature and the                
statement of the problem. To begin with, we assume the two distributions and            Ω1   Ω0  
represented in ​Fig 1​, for which correct answers are on average associated to higher              
confidence levels than wrong answers, but a considerable overlap exists between the two             
distributions (i.e. an individual with a wrong answer can possibly be more confident than an               
individual with the correct answer). 
 
Constitution of the groups. ​In this environment, we compare the performances of the three              
aggregation methods for groups of individuals randomly selected from the sample     N        
population. Therefore, each of the individuals of one group has a probability to give     N      g     q1    
the correct answer and a probability to give the wrong answer. We call the      q0         xp   
independent solution of one specific individual in the group, and the confidence level of      p      cp      
that specific individual. We have if the individual independently provides a correct     xp = 1     p      
answer, and if that individual independently provides a wrong answer. The confidence  xp = 0            
of that individual is then randomly drawn from the distribution if (i.e. the bluecp            Ω1   xp = 1     
distribution in ​Fig 1​), and from the distribution  if  (i.e. the red distribution in ​Fig 1​).Ω2 xp = 0   
 
Aggregation methods. ​The outcome of each aggregation method can be computed for any             
given group composed of individuals. We call , , and the outcomes (0 or 1)  g    N     Mg  W g   Cg       
of the majority rule, the weighted-majority rule, and the transmission chain for that particular              
group , respectively. Furthermore, we call , , and the success chance of the three g      M  W   C        
methods for any group  of size .g N  
For a given group , the outcome of the majority is if and if ,    g        Mg = 1   n1 > n0   Mg = 0   n0 > n1  
where and correspond to the number of group members independently choosing the n1  n0            
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 correct answer (i.e. those with ) and the wrong answer (i.e. those with ),     xp = 1         xp = 0  
respectively. If we choose randomly. For computing the outcome of the  n1 = n0           
weighted-majority, we first measure corresponding to the sum of the confidence levels    m1          cp  
of all the group members who chose the correct answer, and corresponding to the sum           m0      
of the confidence levels of all the group members who chose the wrong answer. We then    cp              
have if and if . If we choose randomly. For the W g = 1   m1 > m0   W g = 0   m0 > m1   m1 = m0       
transmission chain, we first assign each group member to the chain position . We call            p    Xp  
the current collective solution in the chain at position . The first individual located at         p       
position 1 initiates the collective solution with his or her independent solution, leading to              
. For all subsequent chain positions, we assume that the individuals whoseX1 = x1             
confidence level is too low are not confident enough and do not modify the collective               
solution. In contrary, the individuals whose confidence is sufficiently high replace the            
collective solution by their own independent solution if they disagree with it. Formally, we              
define a contribution threshold , and have , if (i.e. the collective solution is    τ    Xp = xp   cp ≥ τ       
replaced by the individual solution if the confidence is high enough) and , if            Xp = Xp−1   cp < τ  
(i.e. the collective solution remains unchanged if the confidence is not high enough). The              
outcome of the transmission chain for that particular group is then , corresponding to           Cg = XN    
the collective solution that is present in the chain after the update of the last individual.  
Unlike the majority and the weighted-majority rules, the definition of the chain method             
requires a parameter . This parameter represents the confidence threshold above which   τ          
individuals are sufficiently confident to ​contribute to the collective solution rather than solely             
forwarding it to the next person. For that reason, we call the contribution threshold. The           τ      
individual is considered to be a contributor when . More specifically, we call positive p         cp ≥ τ       
contributors the group members who bring in the correct answer (i.e., those with and             cp ≥ τ   
), and negative contributors those who bring in the wrong answer (i.e., andxp = 1             cp ≥ τ   
).xp = 0  
 
Example. We illustrate the outcome of each aggregation method in a simple example where              
and . That is, we constitute a group with 10 individuals randomly drawn.6q1 = 0   0N = 1        g       
from a sample population that contains 60% of correct answers. The confidence levels are              
drawn from the distributions shown in ​Fig 1​. In this example, we assume a contribution               
threshold . The independent answers of each group member and their confidence are .6τ = 0             
represented in ​Fig 2A​. In that particular group, five individuals independently provide a             
correct answer, and five others provide a wrong answer. The majority rule results in a tie and                 
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 has, therefore, 50% chance to yield a correct answer and 50% chance to yield a         Mg = 1        
wrong one . In that particular group, the sum of confidence levels among all  Mg = 0             
individuals who provide a correct answer is and the sum of confidence levels       .39m1 = 2        
among those who provide a wrong answer is . The weighted majority rule,        .19m0 = 2      
therefore, yields a correct answer . In the transmission chain, the first individual     W g = 1         
initialises the collective solution with a correct answer. At chain position 2, the individual    X1            
has a wrong answer but is not confident enough ( ) and thus leaves the collective         cp < τ       
solution unchanged. The first contributor with a confidence level higher than appears at           τ    
the chain position 4. That individual replaces the collective solution by a wrong answer. The               
individual at position 6 is also a contributor and replaces the collective solution by the correct                
answer. All subsequent individuals have confidence levels lower than the contribution           
threshold and thus do not impact the collective solution. The correct answer set by the               
individual at position 6 remains unchanged until the end of the chain, leading to for              Cg = 1   
this particular example. 
 
Results 
 
Order effect. ​As compared to the two majority rules, one specificity of the transmission              
chain is the spatial structure of the group, that is, the fact that group members are organised                 
in a linear chain. Yet, a large number of different chains can be produced from a unique                 
group of individuals (precisely, different chains), depending on how the group  N    !N         
members are ordered. What is the impact of the order in which the group members are                
positioned? In the example shown in ​Fig 2​, only two group members are contributors (those               
located at chain position 4 and 6). One of them is a positive contributor whereas the other                 
one is a negative contributor. If the positive contributor is positioned ​after the negative              
contributor, the chain yields a correct answer (because all subsequent individuals are            
neutral). Reversely, if the positive contributor is positioned ​before the negative contributor,            
the chain yields a wrong answer because the wrong answer overrides the correct one. In the                
end, this particular group of individuals has 50% chance to produce a correct answer and               
50% chance to produce a wrong one, depending on the ordering of the two contributors, and                
irrespective of the position of the eight other group members. The ordering, therefore, has a               
strong impact on the expected outcome of the chain in this example. More generally, for a                
given group of individuals, the probability that the chain produces a correct answer is the               
probability that at least one positive contributor appears after the last negative contributor.             
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 This probability equals to , where is the number of positive contributors and    N /(N ) 1 1 + N0   N1         
is the number of negative contributors. The smaller the difference between andN0             N1   N0  
the more the outcome of the chain is sensitive to the ordering of the group members.                
Therefore, a given group of individuals does not always produce a unique outcome with     N           
the transmission chain. Instead, the outcome of the chain depends, to some extent, on the               
order in which the group members are positioned.  
 
Contribution threshold. ​The second specificity of the chain is the presence of social             
influence. Unlike the two other methods, the chain does not aggregate the independant             
answers of every group member. Instead, it filters out the answers of those who are               
confident enough to change the collective solution ​[49]​. The contribution threshold is thus           τ    
an important parameter that determines which individuals are confident enough to contribute            
to the final solution. What is the impact of the contribution threshold ? To address this            τ     
question, we explored the performances of the transmission chain while varying the            
contribution threshold from to . For each value of , we generated 1000 groups   τ = 0   τ = 1      τ      
of size with and the confidence distributions shown in ​Fig 1​, and measured  0N = 1   .6q1 = 0            
the success chance of the chain (i.e., how often it produced a correct answer). The result   C               
is shown in ​Fig 3​. When the contribution threshold is small and approaches , every             τ = 0   
group member is confident enough to contribute. In this case, everyone overrides the             
previous person’s solution and the outcome of the chain is simply the answer of the last                
individual of the chain. Because every individual has a probability of being correct,          .6q1 = 0     
the success chance of the chain is also . Likewise, when the activity threshold        .6C = 0       
approaches , none of the group members are confident enough to contribute. In this τ = 1              
case, the answer of the first individual of the chain remains unchanged until the end of the                 
chain. Because the first individual has a probability of providing a correct answer,        .6q1 = 0       
success chance of the chain is also . Between these two extreme values, the       .6C = 0        
performance of the chain reaches a peak for . At this point, the success chance of        .83τ = 0         
the chain is (i.e. the chain yields a correct answer 93% of the time). In fact, the   .93C = 0                
optimal threshold value maximizes the probability to pick a positive contributor, while at the              
same time minimizes the probability to pick a negative contributor. Note that this             
performance measure takes into account the order effect because groups are randomly            
ordered in each replication. For comparison, the success chance of the majority rule is              
under these conditions, and the success chance of the weighted-majority is.73M = 0             
..90W = 0   
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Group size. ​The weakness of the majority rule in the previous case study was the relatively                
small group size ( ). In fact, the majority of the individuals in the entire sample   0N = 1             
population ​do actually provide the correct answer. Yet, the majority of the group            0N = 1   
members has only 73% chance to produce a correct answer because the majority ​within the               
group often points toward the wrong answer ​[25]​. Hence, group size matters for the majority               
rule. How does it impact the outcome of the transmission chain? To address this question,               
we run an additional series of simulations, this time varying the contribution threshold as             τ   
well as the group size . We generate again 1000 groups of size with and the     N         N   .6q1 = 0    
confidence distributions shown in ​Fig 1​, ​and measure the frequency of correct answers             
produced by the chain for different values of and . As ​Fig 4A shows, group size has        τ   N         
relatively little influence on the chain performances, which increase rapidly until and           0N ≈ 1   
plateaus for larger group sizes. This result is consistent with the previous result showing that               
the ratio between positive and negative contributors is more important than the total number              
of contributors. In addition, the optimal contribution threshold only marginally varies between            
and with increasing group size. ​Fig 4B ​compares the evolution of the.8τ = 0   .9τ = 0             
majority, the weighted-majority and the chain with for increasing values of . While       .85τ = 0      N   
the performance of the majority increases slowly with , the weighted majority and the        N       
transmission chain reach higher performances for smaller group size. This weak           
dependency on for these two methods results from the fact that they also rely on the  N                
individuals’ confidence and can thus extract the correct answer from a smaller number of              
individuals. The weighted-majority and the transmission chain have relatively similar          
performances in this environment, with the chain converging slightly faster to its best             
performance, and the weighted majority converging slower but reaching a slightly higher            
performance level. 
 
Structure of the environment. ​In order to generalize our findings, we explored the             
performances of the three methods for different proportions of correct answers in the           q1    
sample population, and different confidence distributions. It is difficult, however, to vary            
systematically the confidence distributions, because these distributions depend on a total of            
four parameters (i.e., the shape parameters , ​and , ​). Therefore, we computed a      α1  β1   α0  β0      
single confidence indicator from the two distributions and , that we called the       Ω1   Ω0      
confidence utility ​u​ . The confidence utility measures the probability that an individual with the              
correct answer has a higher confidence level than an individual with the wrong answer. In               
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 other words, ​u is the probability that a value drawn from (the confidence associated to            Ω1     
correct answers) is higher than another value drawn from (the confidence associated to         Ω0      
wrong answers). For the simulations, we systematically varied the mean values of and            Ω1   
from 0.1 to 0.9 and computed each time the corresponding confidence utility ​u​ . InΩ0                
addition, we also varied the proportion of correct answers from 0 to 1. For each         q1        
combination of ​u and , we generated 1000 groups of size and measured the    q1        0N = 1     
performance of the three aggregation methods. For the sake of simplicity, we chose the              
contribution threshold that maximises the success chance of the chain for each  τ            
combination of ​u and , such that our results represent the best-case scenario for the    q1            
chain. The results are shown in ​Fig 5​. Clearly, the majority rule does not depend on ​u and                  
has success chances that approach when and when . The     M = 1   .5q1 > 0   M = 0   .5q1 < 0   
majority rule amplifies the dominant view in the population. The weighted-majority has a             
similar pattern but also relies on the group members’ confidence. Therefore, the            
weighted-majority can yield a correct answer even when the population accuracy is           q1   
slightly lower than 0.5, but only when the confidence is a useful cue (i.e., when ​u​ approaches                 
1). Reversely, if the confidence is misleading (i.e. when ​u​ approaches 0), even a population               
accuracy higher than 0.5 is not always sufficient to yield a correct collective answer. The               
performance of the transmission chain exhibits a similar tendency: When confidence is a             
useful cue ( ), the chain performs well, even for extremely low values of . When  .5u > 0            q1   
confidence is less reliable ( ), the chain performance equals the population accuracy.    .5u < 0         
This is due to the fact that, when confidence is misleading, the best contribution threshold is                
such that nobody contributes to the collective solution (i.e. very high value of ), and the             τ    
final solution is simply the first individual’s solution. Hence the chain performs relatively well              
where the majority performs very good, and relatively bad where the majority performs very              
bad. The best aggregation method, therefore, depends on the values of and . Roughly           q1   u   
speaking, the majority is a better method in the upper-left quarter of the parameter spaces (               
and ), the weighted-majority is better in the upper-right quarter ( and.5q1 > 0   .5u < 0          .5q1 > 0   
), and the chain is better in the lower-right quarter ( and ). The.5u > 0           .5q1 < 0   .5u > 0   
lower-left quarter ( and ) is the most difficult environment because the  .5q1 < 0   .5u < 0         
population accuracy and the confidence both point to the wrong answer. In this case, the               
chain is the least bad method because it preserves a small chance of success where the                
majority and the weighted-majority tend to be systematically wrong. 
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 Empirical data. An important question that arises from these simulations is what do real              
environments look like? Knowing the values of and for a given class of problems would       q1   u         
help finding out what is the most efficient aggregation method to use. To address this               
question, we reanalysed two datasets of previously published experiments in which people            
were facing a series of binary-choice tasks. In the first dataset ​[50]​, 109 participants were               
instructed to indicate which of two cities has a larger population, across 1000 pairs of cities.                
For each pair of cities, the participants indicated their answer and their confidence level on a                
continuous scale between 0.5 and 1. In the second dataset ​[22,51]​, a total of 40 physicians                
evaluated 108 cases of skin lesions and were instructed to evaluate whether the lesion is               
cancerous or not-cancerous, and to indicate their confidence level on a Likert scale from 1 to                
4. For each of the 1000 instances of the cities dataset and for each of the 108 instances of                   
the doctors dataset, we estimated the population accuracy by measuring the proportion        q1      
of correct answers among the respondents, and the confidence utility by measuring the          u     
probability that an individual who gave a correct answer reported a higher confidence than              
an individual who gave a wrong answer. For this, we randomly sampled (1000 times, with               
replacement) one individual among those who gave a correct answer and one among those              
who gave a wrong answer, and looked at the frequency at which the first has a higher                 
confidence than the second. In addition, we computed the success chance of the three              
aggregation method, with groups of size . The results are presented in ​Fig 6​. The first      0N = 1           
interesting element is the striking diversity of environmental structures. Within each domain,            
the observed values of and vary almost uniformly between 0 and 1. Nevertheless, a    u   q1           
correlation is visible between these two variables: confidence is a relevant cue when most              
people give the correct answer, and a misleading cue when most people give the wrong               
answer. In other words, confidence tends to be indicative of consensuality rather than             
accuracy – an important result that has been already suggested in previous research ​[8,52]​.              
Consequently, confidence adds little information to what is already available by just looking             
at the individuals' answers. Most cases, therefore, lie in the upper-right and lower-left quarter              
of the parameter space. As expected from our previous simulations, the majority and             
weighted-majority perform best in the upper-right quarter, because both the number of            
individuals and the confidence levels indicate the correct answer. The chain also performs             
relatively well in this area of the parameter space (see ​Fig 5 ​and Figs S1 and S2 ​in the                   
supplementary material), but not as good as the two majority rules. In the lower-left quarter,               
however, all methods exhibit poor performances, because all available information is           
misleading. In this area, the chain does not amplify the misleading information as the two               
majority rules do and, thus, preserves a small chance to yield the correct answer. 
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 When using a single method for all the instances of a task, very little difference of                
performance exist between the three methods. The strengths and weaknesses of each            
method compensate each other at the aggregate scale, leading to similar overall            
performances (For the “cities dataset”: M=74%, W=75%, and C=75%; for the “doctors            
dataset”: M=65%, W=65%, and C=67%). Ideally, one would adaptively choose the most            
efficient aggregation method for each new instance of the task, depending on the expected              
values of and for that instance, but the diversity of observed structures makes it  q1   u             
difficult, if not impossible, to anticipate the nature of an upcoming instance of the problem. 
 
Discussion 
 
We have defined and studied the performance of a new aggregation method – the              
transmission chain – as a tool to improve collective decision-making in binary choice tasks.              
The transmission chain relies on processes of indirect interactions, for which group members             
sequentially try to improve a common collective solution without directly interacting with one             
another. The chain exploits the ​default heuristic – a common bias in people’s             
decision-making: When given a decision to make and a default option, people tend to              
choose the default option unless they have good reasons not to do so ​[53,54]​. In the chain,                 
the “default option” is the current state of the collective solution that has been produced by                
the preceding group members. Thus, most people choose the default option unless they             
strongly disagree with it. In the end, the chain functions as a confidence-based filter: the               
group members who are the most confident contribute to the collective solution whereas             
those who are unsure have no impact on the collective outcome. When comparing the              
transmission chain to the majority and the weighted-majority rules, we have found that the              
chain only outperforms the two other methods for problems of a specific nature, namely,              
when confidence is a reliable indicator ​and when the most people give a wrong answer. In                
the two datasets that we have analysed, however, instances of such nature are rare.  
It is important to note that many behavioural components of our simulations remain             
uncertain. For instance, we have always studied the best-case scenario in our simulations,             
where the contribution threshold is set to the optimal value for each instance of the    τ             
problem. However, the contribution threshold is not a parameter but a behavioural variable,             
for which the experimenter has little control. The exact value of the threshold and whether it                
is well calibrate is an issue that needs to be addressed experimentally. In ​Figs S1 and S2,                 
we compared the chain performances when is adjusted for every instance of the problem      τ          
and when  is fixed for all instances of the problem. Overall, the difference is minor.τ   
14 
 A multitude of implementations can be imagined for the transmission chain. Group members             
can act simultaneously rather than sequentially (i.e., all group members can see the current              
state of the collective solution at the same time and update it at any moment), which should                 
mitigate the order effect. Beside, the collective solution can take various forms. Instead of              
considering only the solution of the predecessor, group members could be exposed to the              k  
previous solutions, or an aggregated form of the previous solutions. This variation should        k       
create a “memory” in the chain. This memory could allow the collective solution to resist to                
the detrimental influence of a few outliers, but at the same time, increase the risk of opinion                 
herding and groupthink ​[5,37,55]​. Finally, participants could be informed about their position            
in the chain and about the number of other group members who have previously contributed               
to the collective solution. This would strengthen the weight of the collective solution at the               
end of the chain, equivalent to gradually increasing the contribution threshold with chain             
position in simulations.  
With regard to the existing literature and to the present results, the transmission chain              
seems to be more suited to cumulative, multidimensional problems than simple binary            
choice tasks. In fact, in complex tasks like writing a Wikipedia article, the group members’               
contributions can take various forms and apply to many different components of the             
collective solution. The contributions to a Wikipedia article, for example, can range from             
correcting a minor typographical error to changing the entire structure of the article or adding               
new content to an existing article. As such, the contributions of the group members              
accumulate​ over time but rarely override each other (except, e.g. in the case of ”edit wars”,                
see, ​[56]​). The same applies to problems addressed in cultural evolution ​[46]​. In contrast,              
binary choice tasks are limited to a single possible action of the group members: switch the                
collective solution to the other answer or not. Thus, every new contribution necessarily             
overrides the previous ones. The cumulative property is therefore absent. Furthermore, the            
uncertainty surrounding the contribution threshold is important. If the contribution threshold is            
well calibrated, the chain is a good candidate for certain types of binary choice tasks.               
Otherwise, the chain will arguably not outperform a simple majority. The next step, therefore,              
is to examine the value of the threshold experimentally, explore more sophisticated            
implementations of the design, and extend the methodology to more complex problems. 
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 Figures 
 
 
 
Figure 1​: Description of the environment​. Assumed distributions of confidence among the            
individuals who provide the correct answer to the problem (in blue), and among those who               
provide a wrong answer to the problem (in red). The interval of confidence values ranges               
from (very uncertain) to (very certain). The blue and red distributions are beta c = 0     c = 1           
distributions with shape parameters and (mean value: 0.8), and and    α1 = 8   β1 = 2      α0 = 3   
(mean value: 0.5), respectively. In the simulations, a proportion of the sampleβ0 = 3           q1     
population gives the correct answer and have confidence levels drawn from the blue             
distribution, and a proportion of the sample population gives a wrong answer and    q0 = 1 − q1           
have confidence levels drawn from the red distribution. In empirical data, the shape             
parameters of the blue and red distributions depend on the nature of the task. 
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Figure 2​: Illustration of a transmission chain. For this case study, we assume a group               
size of , and a proportion of correct answers . (A) The individuals are  0N = 1        .6q1 = 0    N    
randomly drawn from the sample population and assigned to a random position in the chain               
(the red and blue dots). Among them, five individuals have the correct answer (i.e., the blue                
dots at chain positions 1, 3, 5, 6, and 10), and five individuals have a wrong answer (i.e., the                   
red dots at chain position 2, 4, 7, 8, and 9). The black dashed line represents the activity                  
threshold indicating the confidence level above which individuals contribute to the .6τ = 0            
collective solution. The “contributors” replace the current collective solution by their own            
solution. Individuals who do not contribute (i.e., those with a confidence level lower than )              τ  
leave the collective solution unchanged. (B) The resulting collective solution in the chain at              
each position. The blue open circles indicate a correct answer, and the red open circles               
indicate a wrong one. In this example, the individual at chain position 1 initialises the               
collective solution with a correct answer. The collective solution remains unchanged until the             
contributor at chain position 4 replaces it by a wrong answer. The individual at position 6 is                 
also a contributor and restores the correct answer. All other individuals have no impact on               
the collective solution. In this example, the chain generates a correct solution.  
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Figure 3​: Impact of the contribution threshold ​. The red line indicates the probability       τ        
that the chain generates a correct solution for different values of the contribution threshold ,              τ  
assuming a group size of , a proportion of correct answers and the     0N = 1       .6q1 = 0    
confidence distributions shown in ​Fig 1​. In these conditions, the optimal value for the              
contribution threshold is , for which the chain produces the correct solution 93% of   .83τ = 0            
the time. The grey and blue lines indicate the success chances of the majority and the                
weighted-majority rules, respectively.  
 
 
 
Figure 4​: ​Impact of the group size ​N​ . (A) The color-coding indicates the probability of               
success of the chain method as a function of the group size and the contribution threshold            N     
. The column of values at corresponds to the red curve shown in ​Fig 3​. (B)τ       0N = 1            
Comparison of the performance of the chain method with the contribution threshold set to              
(in red), the majority rule (in grey), and the weighted-majority rule (in blue). These.85τ = 0                
results are computed assuming a proportion of correct answer and the confidence         .6q1 = 0     
distributions shown in ​Fig 1​. 
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Figure 5: ​Impact of population structure​. Expected performance of the majority, the            
weighted-majority, and the transmission chain as a function of the proportion of correct             
answers in the sample population and the confidence utility . The confidence utility is q1          u      
the probability that an individual with a correct answer reports a higher confidence level than               
another individual with a wrong answer. The group size is .0N = 1   
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Figure 6​: Population structure and corresponding best method for two binary-choice           
task studies. (A) Experimental participants evaluating which of two cities has a larger             
population. The task is repeated across 1000 different pairs of cities. Each point in the graph                
corresponds to one instance of the task (i.e., one pair of cities). (B) Dermoscopists              
evaluating 108 cases of skin lesions and evaluating whether the lesion is cancerous or              
not-cancerous. Each point in the graph corresponds to one medical case. In (A) and (B) the                
position of each point indicates the proportion of respondents (i.e., participants or doctors)             
who provided the correct answer (​y​ -axis), and the confidence utility (​x​ -axis) for that case.              
The border colour of each point indicates the aggregation method that performs best in this               
particular case (the majority in blue, the weighted-majority in red, and the chain in green).               
Cases for which several methods perform equally good are represented in blue if the              
majority rule is one of them and in red if the weighted-majority is one of them. In addition, the                   
grey-scale colour inside each point indicates the success chance of the best performing             
method, ranging from 0 (in black) to 1 (in white). These results are calculated assuming               
1000 groups of  individuals randomly sampled from the pool of available respondents.0N = 1  
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Figure S1: ​Performance of different aggregation method for groups of size in           , 10, 20N = 3     
the cities dataset. Each line corresponds to one aggregation method. The fixed chain has              
the contribution threshold fixed to for all instances of the task (in contrast to the chain     .8τ = 0             
for which the contribution threshold is adjusted between instances of the task). Each point in               
26 
 the graphs corresponds to one city comparison task. The position of each point indicates the               
proportion of participants who provided the correct answer (​y​ -axis), and the confidence utility             
(​x​ -axis) for that task . The colour of each point indicates the success chance of each method                 
for that particular task. 
 
 
 
Figure S2: ​Performance of different aggregation methods for groups of size in           , 10, 20N = 3     
the doctors dataset. Each line corresponds to one aggregation method. The fixed chain has              
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 the contribution threshold fixed to for all instances of the task (in contrast to the chain     τ = 3             
method for which the contribution threshold is adjusted between instances of the task). Each              
point in the graphs corresponds to one medical case. The position of each point indicates               
the proportion of doctors who provided the correct answer (​y​ -axis), and the confidence utility              
(​x​ -axis) for that case . The colour of each point indicates the success chance of each                
method for that particular case. 
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